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+# Expanded Permissioned Challenger
+
+## Context
+
+The OP Stack currently officially provides two dispute game types, the standard `FaultDisputeGame`
+contract and the alternative `PermissionedDisputeGame`. The `PermissionedDisputeGame` is meant to
+act either as the default game for chains that, for whatever reason, do not want to run a
+permissionless game or as a fallback game type if bugs in the `FaultDisputeGame` are discovered.
+
+The `PermissionedDisputeGame` for a chain specifies a `CHALLENGER` address that is allowed to
+challenge a proposal created by the pre-defined `PROPOSER` address. Most OP Stack chains configure
+this `CHALLENGER` address to be the same as the System Owner address.
+
+## Problem Statement
+
+Most OP Stack chains configure the `CHALLENGER` address to be the same as the System Owner address.
+OP Mainnet currently also follows this pattern. However, OP Mainnet is unique in that the System
+Owner address is a 2/2 multisig between the Optimism Foundation and the Optimism Security Council.
+Combined with the Optimism Foundation's role as the Deputy Guardian, this can lead to some
+interesting security edge cases.
+
+Recent standardization over the last few months around ideal security models has led to the
+conclusion that, until Stage 2, we should aim to operate under the assumption that a minority of
+the Security Council can only cause a liveness failure (and not a safety failure). The current
+model for the OP Mainnet means that a minority of the Security Council could cause a safety failure
+if this minority is coordinating with a compromised Optimism Foundation multisig.
+
+Specifically, the attack vector in question would function as follows:
+
+1. Compromise or otherwise cause the Optimism Foundation multisig to act maliciously.
+1. Use the Optimism Foundation's power as Deputy Guardian to trigger the fallback.
+1. Create an invalid proposal and corresponding dispute game.
+1. Cause a minority of the Security Council to *not* act to invalidate the proposal.
+
+We want to resolve this discrepancy with minimal contract changes.
+
+## Proposed Solution
+
+We propose resolving this discrepancy by changing the address of the `CHALLENGER` to be a smart
+contract that allows the Guardian OR any member of the Security Council Safe to trigger a
+challenge. This means that either of these two groups could cause a liveness failure if the system
+is using the `PermissionedDisputeGame` but also means that the Foundation Safe can no longer cause
+a safety failure in coordination with a minority of the Security Council Safe.
+
+Since this would be a change to the address of the `CHALLENGER`, we would not need to modify the
+`PermissionedDisputeGame` contract itself. We would introduce a new contract that essentially has
+the name/role `PermissionedChallenger` where the Guardian or any member of the Security Council
+Safe can act as the `PermissionedChallenger`.
+
+For simplicity, we constrain the `PermissionedChallenger` to calling the `move` function with a
+pre-defined fake claim that can only be triggered against the top-level claim. Since no other moves
+are possible, the `PermissionedChallenger` will always win.
+
+The interface for the `PermissionedChallenger` would be something like:
+
+```solidity
+interface IPermissionedChallenger {
+    function challenge(IDisputeGame _game) external;
+}
+```
+
+We would additionally need to implement the proposal in
+[Design Doc 138](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/design-docs/pull/138) to guarantee that the
+proposer cannot also play in the dispute game, which would potentially allow the proposer to
+exploit bugs in the dispute game if they exist. Given that the `PermissionedDisputeGame` fallback
+is primarily meant to be used in the case that a bug in the `FaultDisputeGame` is discovered, it
+is very realistic that such a bug would exist if the `PermissionedDisputeGame` is being used.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### Challenger Array
+
+We considered modifying the `PermissionedDisputeGame` to accept an array of challenger addresses
+instead of just a single `CHALLENGER`. This has a number of downsides:
+
+1. We would have to modify the `PermissionedDisputeGame`.
+1. We would have to re-deploy the `PermissionedDisputeGame` any time that the Security Council Safe
+   updates its set of members.
+1. It would be harder to quickly understand who can act in the `PermissionedDisputeGame`.
+
+## Risks & Uncertainties
+
+### Liveness
+
+Our primary risk with this proposal is that any member of the Security Council Safe can now cause a
+liveness failure if the game is in the `PermissionedDisputeGame` mode. Although this is the desired
+behavior, it also means that a malicious Security Council Safe member can cause a liveness failure
+in the `PermissionedDisputeGame` until that member is replaced by a majority of other members.
+
+### Audit
+
+We may have to carry out a brief audit on the `PermissionedChallenger` contract. We do not expect
+that this contract would be particularly complex, so such an audit would be relatively minimal.
+
+### L2Beat
+
+We should confirm with L2Beat that this proposal resolves the concerns that have been raised.
+
+### Runbooks
+
+We would need to update any existing runbooks with this new protocol.