Lively Banana Gazelle - Gas Limit Issues in _rewardPreviousVouchers() leads dos

[sherlock-admin2]

Lively Banana Gazelle

Medium

Gas Limit Issues in _rewardPreviousVouchers() leads dos

Summary

The function iterates through an array of vouchIds. If this array becomes very large, the loop could consume excessive gas and exceed the block gas limit.https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2024-11-ethos-network-ii/blob/main/ethos/packages/contracts/contracts/ReputationMarket.sol

Root Cause

• Unbounded Iteration: The loop iteates up to totalVouches, which is the length of the vouchIds array. There's no inherent limit on how many vouches a profile can receive, so this array can grow very large.

• Gas Cost per Iteration: Each iteration of the loop performs several storage reads (accessing vouches, vouch.archived, vouch.balance), calculations (amount.mulDiv), and storage writes vouch.balance += reward

• Cumulative Gas Cost - vouchIds array grows cumulative gas cost of the loop increases proportionally. If the total gas cost exceeds the block gas limit, the transaction will fai preventing the distribution of rewards.

• Denial-of-Service (DoS) Vector: A malicious actor could create a large number of vouches for a specific profile, making the _rewardPreviousVouchers() function prohibitively expensive to call.

Internal pre-conditions

No response

External pre-conditions

No response

Attack Path

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Impact

No response

PoC

No response

Mitigation

No response