You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Currently vm-boot-protect is the most compatible mode for Whonix VMs (but see issue #31).
It might be desirable to explore using the more extensive vm-boot-protect-root mode for whonix-ws VMs by mapping which Tor and Whonix files in /rw should be whitelisted. Going beyond whitelists to use deployment files and hashes might also be useful.
The goal would be to provide some after-restart mitigation to whonix-ws AppVMs that have experienced some kind of attack involving a successful privilege escalation. Hopefully, this attack resistance would be in addition to whatever persistence (bookmarks, saved documents, etc.) that the user gains vs using a DispVM.
whonix-setup-wizard skip status files were moved from
/var/cache/whonix-setup-wizard/status-files
to
/usr/share/whonix-setup-wizard/status-files
in git master (later coming in Whonix 15 package upgrades) to rely
less/not on bind-dirs / rw for this purpose.
To ease analysis of this all the bind-dirs that Whonix is using were
reviewed and documented just now.
https://github.com/Whonix/qubes-whonix/blob/master/usr/lib/qubes-bind-dirs.d/40_qubes-whonix.conf
Ideally the number of bind-dirs Whonix is using could be reduced to 0 or
as few as possible. Not only for Qubes-VM-hardening. That's generally
good to keep things simple.
Some thing could be moved from /var/lib or /var/cache to somewhere in
/home (but not /home/user). On the other hand an unclean /home folder
with a lot of junk (like /home/whonix for status files) also seems bad.
Currently
vm-boot-protect
is the most compatible mode for Whonix VMs (but see issue #31).It might be desirable to explore using the more extensive
vm-boot-protect-root
mode for whonix-ws VMs by mapping which Tor and Whonix files in /rw should be whitelisted. Going beyond whitelists to use deployment files and hashes might also be useful.The goal would be to provide some after-restart mitigation to whonix-ws AppVMs that have experienced some kind of attack involving a successful privilege escalation. Hopefully, this attack resistance would be in addition to whatever persistence (bookmarks, saved documents, etc.) that the user gains vs using a DispVM.
cc @adrelanos
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: