Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Security features v2.6.2 #1731

Closed
wants to merge 188 commits into from
Closed

Security features v2.6.2 #1731

wants to merge 188 commits into from

Conversation

dlpzx
Copy link
Contributor

@dlpzx dlpzx commented Dec 4, 2024

Feature or Bugfix

  • Feature

Detail

Security features:

Dependencies

Relates

  • Security release

Security

Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write N/A. Based on
OWASP 10.

  • Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this includes
    fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an S3 bucket)?
    • Is the input sanitized?
    • What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you consume?
    • Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
    • Have you ensured no eval or similar functions are used?
  • Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires authorization?
    • How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
    • Are you logging failed auth attempts?
  • Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
    • Do you use a standard proven implementations?
    • Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
  • Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
    • Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?

By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

petrkalos and others added 30 commits July 22, 2024 13:11
### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
- fix the wrong cluster arn (now pull from construct)
- improve db-name handling

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
- delete_env takes the env object

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Bugfix


### Detail
- Tree View from mui lab is deprecated and no longer renders on FE
appropriately --> move to `@mui/x-tree-view`

### Relates


### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->


### Detail
- Make sure alembic auto generate detects resource lock model by adding
imports as part of `init` files


### Relates


### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Feature

### Detail
![MF
DB](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fb73a260-afc4-4811-850a-3a8600c4eb03)



### Relates
- #1065 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
### Feature or Bugfix
- Dependencies

### Detail
Upgrade "fast-xml-parser": "4.4.1" to non vulnerable version 


When running yarn install the yarn-lock file was updated removing some
unnecessary packages.
### Relates
- [security
recommendation](GHSA-mpg4-rc92-vx8v)

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…1439)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail

`dataall.core.permissions.db.resource_policy.resource_policy_repositories.ResourcePolicyRepository.query_all_resource_policies`
is missing @staticmethod and is taking session as self.

I am not sure of the implications. Because there are some arguments that
can be None it was not failing, but it might not have deleted some
permissions

### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Refactoring

### Detail
- new api query `queryEnum` to query multiple enums at once by names
- shared frontend util to query several enums (fetchEnums`) by name.
Output -- dictionary
```
{
 'enumName': [{name: '...', value: '..'}]
}
```
- example for Maintenance mode enum

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
### Feature or Bugfix

- Bugfix


### Detail
- replace Object.assign for enums
 
### Relates
- #1435

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
The design is up-to-date in the issue
#955 as well as next steps

### Relates
- #955 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail

- Resolved issue raised in -
#1432

### Relates
- #1432

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)? N/A
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization? N/A
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features? N/A
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users? N/A
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…1452)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
in update_share_item_status_batch we pass `processor.type.value` but
`processor.type` is expected

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…lients (#1449)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
- Use client factories in Redshift boto3 clients
- use single mock for the factory clients

### Relates
- #1424 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…#1447)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature
TO BE MERGED AFTER #1424 and
after #1449

### Detail

This PR is part of the design explained in detail in #955 
- Add check that verifies the Redshift cluster imported is encrypted
before creating a redshift connection
- Store the Redshift encryption type in the redshift-connection table.
This is needed because Redshift datashares only work between namespaces
that use the same encryption type
- In the migration script and in the db model of the redshift-connection
table we add the columns encryptionType and connectionType.
ConnectionType is not needed in this particular PR, but it will be
needed in the next PR. It is added to simplify the migration scripts

### Relates
- #955 - Sharing part

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature


### Detail
Complete design in #955.
This particular PR is part of the redshift dataset sharing
implementation. (It is easier to see the snapshots)
- To be able to share redshift items this PR enables the request access
button for redshift tables and datasets
- IMPORTANT: New request modal for Redshift Datasets that lists
namespaces with connections that are of type ADMIN (we cannot open a
share request for namespaces that are not "linked" to data.all). See a
screenshot of this request below:
- It adds icons in the Catalog search view for each item
- It adds the type of item right below the Catalog item
- It standardizes the icons used in the dataset list and in the Catalog
with the latests AWS public icons
- It fixes the principal type for principals that are not groups or
consumption roles
- It moves the consumption data details outside of the share view as a
child component and renders it conditionally only if the dataset type is
S3.


![Screenshot 2024-08-05 at 16 14
26](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/35e60ada-3ce0-4fad-a1b0-c4f631624b3f)
![Screenshot 2024-08-05 at 17 45
15](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d7d67a9f-8387-425e-b17c-d1ae9f8745bd)

### Key decisions
- Separate request modal for redshift - we could have re-used the
request access modal, but it contains several elements that are very
particular to S3 (e.g. consumption roles, checking that the policy is
attached). So I decided to keep it separate. This way future changes to
any of the sharing methods is independent from each other.

### Relates
- #955 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Relates
- #1456

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

---------

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Anushka Singh <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: trajopadhye <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Mohit Arora <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: rbernota <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Rick Bernotas <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Raj Chopde <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Noah Paige <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: dlpzx <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jaidisido <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: dlpzx <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: mourya-33 <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: nikpodsh <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: MK <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Manjula <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Zilvinas Saltys <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Zilvinas Saltys <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Lorch <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Tejas Rajopadhye <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Zilvinas Saltys <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
…1451)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

⚠️ Needs to be merged after #1447 

### Detail
Complete design in #955.
This particular PR is part of the redshift dataset sharing
implementation.

To be able to do sharing, the dataset namespace and the consumer
namespace need to be accessible by data.all. For this reason we
introduce the concept of types of connections. When opening a share
request, the datasets that can be shared are only those whose namespace
has an admin connection + the requester redshift role will be selected
from a list of namespaces with admin connections.

In addition, this PR adds the namespaceId in the RDS database for both
serverless and provisioned clusters, as it is very handy information
when working with datashares

### Relates
- #955 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…le (#1461)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
Complete design in #955.
This particular PR is part of the redshift dataset sharing
implementation.
- it adds the `redshift_datasets_shares` module package and its __init__
file
- it creates the main subpackages in the module
- it registers the share processor and creates the base share processor
- in db.repository it adds a EnvironmentResource class to prevent orphan
resources left in environment deletes
- it adds the module in config.json
- It adds RedshiftTable as a ShareableItem
- It adds RedshiftRole as a PrincipalType (also remove unused types,
including one only used in testing the subscription task)

### Relates
- #955 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…ed (#1466)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
- Hide access point consumer details if access points feature is
disabled

### Relates
#1464

### Security
N/A

By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature
⚠️ merge after #1461 

### Detail
Complete design in #955.
This particular PR is part of the redshift dataset sharing
implementation. The purpose of this particular PR is to make the create
share object more generic. At the moment it is intertwined with IAM
roles and share policies that need to be attached to them.
- Rename ShareObject.principalIAMRoleName as
ShareObject.principalRoleName and make it a mandatory field
- Rename usages of principalIAMRoleName
- Add migration script
- Make attachMissingPolicies an optional input parameter for
createShareObject and default it to false
- Add principalRoleName as an optional input parameter for
createShareObject
- Modify createShareObject service to skip IAM actions on non
Group/ConsumptionRole principal types

This PR fixes the creation of different types of share objects; but the
ideal design should not include if-conditions in create_share_object.
Instead the input could include a field for "additional_actions" such as
['CHECK_IAM_ROLE', 'ATTACH_MISSING_POLICIES'] that handle the different
principal cases in a more generic way. I listed this as enhancements in
the original ticket.

### Relates
- #955 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
- Sidebar item "Metadata Forms" if module enabled
- List of all Metadata Forms
- Search in the list by Name or Description
- Create Metadata Form (no fields yet)
- Integration test (create, delete, list)

### Relates
- #1065 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized? **Yes**
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume? **backend typisation**
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries? **yes**
- Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used? **no evals
or similar**
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization? **NA**
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features? **NA**
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users? **NA**


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix


### Detail
- Make intergration tests for MFs backend-internals agnostic

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
…#1423)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
Currently if approval tests are running and a new backend deployment
happens (tests take a long time ~50 minutes so this scenario if very
likely) then the tests will run against the new deployment.
With the propose change the tests are running as part of the backend
deployment stage which is an atomic unit.


![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0068d1ac-7783-4a11-97fa-770eed21246f)


### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Local Dev Bugfix


### Detail
- Fix `register_processor` for local data.all to correctly process
shares


### Relates


### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
- Submit request redirects to share request page instead of catalog page

### Relates
- #1468

### Testing
- Submit request button redirects to share page and not catalog anymore.

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Feature

### Detail
- Add checkov scans on cdk synth output

### Relates
- #1023 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
- Metadata Form View page
- Added 'description' to Metadata Form Field model
- NO ACCESS RESTRICTIONS for now
User Can:
- Delete dataform
- Add new fields to data form
- Edit fields
- Delte fields

### Relates
- #1065 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sofia Sazonova <[email protected]>
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Feature

### Detail
- Add row/column level filters for table share items in data.all

### Relates
- #348



### ⚠️ Important Call Outs for This PR ⚠️ 

- (1) data.all will NO LONGER support cross account sharing of table
data to QuickSight Principals (i.e. QS Groups)
- This PR introduces a more efficient sharing mechanism to directly
share with foreign IAM principals (not support with QS Principals at the
moment)
- Access to data via QuickSight in same account is still supported as
well as sharing of QuickSight dashboards
- Please look at [comments in
issue](#348 (comment))
for more details on sharing mechanism, most importantly the changes
involve:
        - Upgrade to using LF Data Catalog Settings Version 3
- Direct shares to IAM Principals (for both cross or same account
principals)

- (2) data.all will NO LONGER support "old_share" naming convention
- Sharing of dataset tables was improved to reuse share DB and resource
link resources as of [this
PR](#1016) released in
[version
v2.3.0](https://github.com/data-dot-all/dataall/releases/tag/v2.3.0)
- "old_share" naming convention can be identified as shared database
resources that follow the naming convention `source_db_name + '_shared_'
+ shareUri` (new naming convention is ``source_db_name + '_shared`)
- To update to new naming convention please revoke and recreate the
table share on data.all >= v2.3.0
- More details on migration path to be provided closer to release of
v2.7.0!

- (3) As part of upgrade from v2.6 -> v2.7 data.all admins will have to
verify + reapply all of the table shares in data.all
- There are already built-in ECS Tasks to easily manage verify + reapply
for you!
- This will allow data.all to migrate all table shares to the new direct
share to foreign IAM principals and clean up unused LakeFormation
permissions (wherever applicable)

- (4) With this PR there will be a change to the way preview-ability of
table data + metadata works
- Please read [comment
below](#1438 (comment))
for more details




### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…ms (#1478)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
Given 2 pull requests that were tested but approved&merged at different
points in time the alembic migration scripts run into a history mismatch
because the migrations sequence ended up with 2 heads.

<img width="739" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0f311f46-63e1-494a-a153-e4836ec8dd53">


`add_data_filters_table` should be executed after
`mf_field_description`. This PR updates the down revision of
`add_data_filters_table` accordingly to end up with:


<img width="618" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/929d746a-c3f6-4985-8df7-d61f0f84de85">



### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
Complete design in #955.
This particular PR is focused on small FE enhancements to adapt the
share views to Redshift shares:

Add RedshiftTable as type to plot in shareView -> list Items, edit (add
items), verify items
![Screenshot 2024-08-12 at 13 29
18](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0c48ca8f-5ce4-41c5-aca9-62928c4345d0)

Solve issue with redirect in the ShareView header (it redirected to
s3-datasets/dataset/uri)

Add principal resolver that resolves as principal the Redshift role
(also removed unused fields for principal in backend)
![Screenshot 2024-08-12 at 13 31
07](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/60be4e6d-fb0c-4a23-9e04-3775f9d0d4f8)

Replace IAM role references with a generic role and added icons
![Screenshot 2024-08-12 at 13 31
51](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1798a902-3398-4cbc-8aef-96797298c91a)

Finally, added shares tab in the Redshift Dataset View:

![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e321304c-8dfa-460f-bca0-ef24f4fcb594)

### Relates
- #955 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
noah-paige and others added 29 commits November 12, 2024 09:30
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Bugfix


### Detail
- Add Validation Checks for the Following Mutations
    - UpdateGroupTenantPermissions —> Ensure valid Group
    - CreateWorksheet —> Ensure valid Group Owner
- Add Sanitization for Inputs using `tags.contains({{{term}}}` to
properly handle non-alphanumeric chars


### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Bugfix


### Detail
- Allow `:` and `.` chars

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Refactoring

### Detail
Moved business logic of Worksheets to service layer.
Needed #1694 

### Relates
#1694 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Refactoring

### Detail
- Move access logging to a separate environment logging bucket (rather
than env default bucket used for athena queries and profiling job
artifacts)

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…1697)

### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Bugfix

### Detail
- Fix integration test teardown of environment bug on cleaning up
EnvironmentLogsBucketName


### Relates
- #1695 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Enhancement

### Detail
- Add explicit token duration (60 min) over default 60 min

### Relates
- #1682 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Bugfix


### Detail
- Update fastapi dependency

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Dependency

### Detail
- Upgrade cross spawn to avoid
GHSA-3xgq-45jj-v275

### Relates
- GHSA-3xgq-45jj-v275

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
This PR introduces `MANAGE_SHARES` permission to enable data.all admins
the ability to enable/disable shares permissions at the
application-level.

The new permission would get created in the savepermissions Lambda
trigger; but by default the permissions would be disabled for all
existing groups in the platform. This would cause breaking changes and
admins would need to enable this permission manually for each group. To
avoid this, this PR includes a migration script that creates the
permission and attaches it to existing groups.
### Testing
- [x] Test migration script locally
- [x] Test migration script in CICD
- [x] Perform share mutations in real AWS deployment (approve share
object, submit, add items) with tenant permissions
- [x] Perform share mutations in real AWS deployment (approve share
object, submit, add items) WITHOUT tenant permissions (See screenshot)



![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/961194a1-4e72-4399-8c20-f6962956ef8d)

### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
-

### Detail
- Disable introspection on `prod_sizing`

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Feature

### Detail
- Add weekly run of snyk

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Bugfix


### Detail
- Bump python runtime and cdk klayers cryptography version for custom
authorizer


### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
Add unit tests that verify that MANAGE_X permissions are applied to all
Mutations except for an OPT_OUT list of Mutations and to a subset of
OPT_IN queries.

The OPT_OUT mutations are either:
- admin actions that can only be performed by the tenants. Applying
permissions in this case does not make sense.
- platform "support" features such as feed, notification, votes. No
object needs to be protected in this case.
- v2.7.0 features which will be addressed in a separate PR

The OPT_IN queries are operations that retrieve credentials or redirect
URLs that allow the user to effectively create/update data.all objects.

### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Bugfix

### Detail
- Add args `--all-projects --detection-depth=5` for Snyk to find project
Dep
- Add MakeFile command to install all Python Deps before running `snyk
test`
- Noted as a requirement in [Snyk
Docs](https://docs.snyk.io/scm-ide-and-ci-cd-integrations/snyk-ci-cd-integrations/github-actions-for-snyk-setup-and-checking-for-vulnerabilities/snyk-python-action)

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
- Added service function and check if the user is a tenant for the
updateSSM API call

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
- Add GET_SHARE_OBJECT permissions to get data filters API
- Cosmetic changes on shares_base module

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…#1718)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
For the `listS3DatasetsOwnedByEnvGroup` API call this PR introduces a
permission check to evaluate if the user has `LIST_ENVIRONMENT_DATASETS`
in the environment and on top of that it checks that the input groupUri
is one of the groups of the user performing the call.

+ some cosmetic changes: internal functions prefixed with `_`

### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
In the run_sql query in Worksheets we are checking the permissions of
the user to execute the query if the user has environment-level
permissions to execute queries. This does not prevent a user to use
another team's worksheets to execute athena queries. This means that the
user would use other team permissions to query data.

This PR retrieves the worksheet using the service decorated
get_worksheet function

### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Refactoring

### Detail
-  Unify Logger Config in Backend (focused on `/tasks`)
-  Fix Log Level setting

### Relates
- #1680
- #1662
### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->

### Detail
- Change GitHub Action step from using `snyk/actions/python-3.9@master`
to `snyk/actions/setup@master`
- `snyk/actions/setup@master` will just install Snyk CLI and we add step
to explicitly call `snyk test ...` with our arguments
- Changed because `snyk/actions/python-3.9@master` was setting up some
virtual env and not finding the installed dependencies from `make
install` (leading to Snyk skipping over the checks on
`requirements.txt`)


- Alternatives Explored
- Specifying `package-manager` to pip rather than poetry (Poetry shell
was being created that did not carry over installed deps from before
using `snyk/actions/python-3.9@master`)
        - But not supported with `all-projects` flag
- Adding configuration to `pyproject.toml` to prevent venv creation
(could not find a working solution)
- Using venvs and exporting PATH env variable to be used later by Snyk
action step (could not find a working solution)


### Relates
- #1708

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
#1720)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix - integration tests

### Detail
Update integration tests with additional checks included in
#1718

### Relates
- #1718

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
- Added permissions to Quicksight monitoring service layer: it now
checks that the user belongs to the tenant group

### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Refactoring

### Detail
* make dashboards optional based on the presence of config (not by
querying AWS)
* implcitly skip tests if dashboards fixture raises `pytest.skip`
* simplify set_env_params logic using sets
* remove params from create_env query and enable specific feature per
module


### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…and cleanup unused code (#1719)

### Feature or Bugfix
- Bugfix

### Detail
Added permission check on the list datasets API calls from the S3 shares
module. Ensuring that only environment members can see environment
shared datasets.

++ remove some unused code

### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature

### Detail
In the functional tests (`/tests`)
- Add a new test to check create_omics_run permissions
- improve the assertions in the other unauthorized tests

As a result we achieve a 97% coverage for omics service (the remaining
3% is an edge case that results from a messy clean-up of the db)
<img width="313" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a5c4fd44-2b97-441a-9207-d9361f1c75d4">


### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
…ation tests (#1721)

### Feature or Bugfix
<!-- please choose -->
- Feature
- Bugfix
- Refactoring

### Detail
In the frontend Glossary operations that involve creating, modifying or
deleting (WRITE) glossary resources are limited to the Glossary admins.
To mimic this behavior in the backend this PR introduces permission
checks that ensure that only the glossary admins can execute mutations
on the glossary.

In addition, the PR includes integration tests for the unauthorized
testing scenarios.


#### Testing 

deployed Lambda in real AWS account
- tested glossary owners can create, update and delete nodes
- tested unauthorized users cannot execute API mutations
programatically. They obtain errors of the type: `An error occurred
(UnauthorizedOperation) when calling GLOSSARY MUTATION operation:\n User
[email protected] is not the admin of the glossary Sesssion
glossary1.\n ", "locations": [{"line": 2, "column": 3}], "path":
["updateCategory"]}]}% `

### Relates

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Refactoring
- Feature

### Detail
- Add permissions to getTrustedAccount API
- Remove usage of central account in administrator view dashboard tab
- refactor environment Service functions to use decorator for resource
policies
- Added LINK_ENVIRONMENT permissions instead of GET_ORGANIZATION to
`get_pivot_role`, `get_external_id`, `get_pivot_role_template`

### Testing:
- [X] CICD deployment completes
- Add permissions to getTrustedAccount API
- [X] in environment creation form view we can get the trusted account
- Remove usage of central account in administrator view dashboard tab
    - [X] admin view renders without issue
- refactor environment Service functions to use decorator for resource
policies
    - [X] enable_subscriptions with unauthorized user = unauthorized
    - [X] enable_subscriptions with authorized user = success
    - [X] disable_subscriptions with unauthorized user = unauthorized
    - [X] disable_subscriptions with authorized user = success
- [X] get environment assume role url with unauthorized user =
unauthorized -- it throws error of user does not belong to group
- [X] get environment assume role url with authorized user = success
- [X] get environment access token with unauthorized user = unauthorized
    - [X] get environment access token with authorized user = success
- Added LINK_ENVIRONMENT permissions instead of GET_ORGANIZATION to
`get_pivot_role`, `get_external_id`, `get_pivot_role_template`
- [X] Now we get an Unauthorized error message when LINK_ENVIRONMENT
permissions are missing before hitting the create Environment button
### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature
- Bugfix

### Detail
In some edge cases where a category and term is orphan and does not have
a Glossary as parent we would run into an infinite loop in the
glossaries permission check. This PR adds a maximum depth level (which
in reality is lower, categories can only host terms, the
REAL_MAX_DEPTH=3)


### Relates
- #1721 

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
### Feature or Bugfix
- Feature
- Bugfix

### Detail
The Feeds module is used in the frontend in several modules. Some
restrict access to admins only and some don't. In this PR we unify the
behavior. ONLY ADMINS CAN SEE THE FEED in the frontend.
- Dashboards: accessible to any user -----> add isAdmin
- PIpelines: accessible to any user  -----> add isAdmin
- Redshift_Datasets: accessible to admin users only
- Redshift_Tables : accessible to admin users only
- S3_Datasets: accessible to admin users only
- Folders: accessible to admin users only
- Tables: accessible to admin users only

Alongside the frontend changes, the backend should follow the same logic
and restrict the API calls with permissions checks. That is what this PR
does, it introduces resource permission checks depending on the Feed
targetType with GET_X permission checks.

- [x] Add security-focused tests for unauthorized cases

<img width="1183" alt="Screenshot 2024-11-26 at 14 49 56"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f71292f1-1c90-4e35-a040-17d246ce2b68">


### Testing
- [X] UI shows chat button for admins (creators or admin team) -
verified in Datasets and Dashboards
- [X] UI does not show chat button for non-admins - verified in Datasets
and Dashboards
- [x] Deploy in AWS
- Call getFeed, postFeedMessage with resource admin (with GET
permissions) and get feed
    - [X] Dataset
    - [x] Table
    - [x] Folder
    - [X] Redshift Dataset
    - [X] Redshift Table
    - [x] Dashboard 
- Call getFeed, postFeedMessage with another team not the resource admin
(with UPDATE permissions) and get unauthorized response:
    - [X] Dataset
    - [x] Table
    - [x] Folder
    - [x] Redshift Dataset
    - [x] Redshift Table
    - [x] Dashboard 
### Relates
- <URL or Ticket>

### Security
Please answer the questions below briefly where applicable, or write
`N/A`. Based on
[OWASP 10](https://owasp.org/Top10/en/).

- Does this PR introduce or modify any input fields or queries - this
includes
fetching data from storage outside the application (e.g. a database, an
S3 bucket)?
  - Is the input sanitized?
- What precautions are you taking before deserializing the data you
consume?
  - Is injection prevented by parametrizing queries?
  - Have you ensured no `eval` or similar functions are used?
- Does this PR introduce any functionality or component that requires
authorization?
- How have you ensured it respects the existing AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms?
  - Are you logging failed auth attempts?
- Are you using or adding any cryptographic features?
  - Do you use a standard proven implementations?
  - Are the used keys controlled by the customer? Where are they stored?
- Are you introducing any new policies/roles/users?
  - Have you used the least-privilege principle? How?


By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made
under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
@dlpzx dlpzx closed this Dec 4, 2024
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

9 participants