VMEmu uses unicorn to emulate x86_64 instructions which make up the virtual machine handlers. This project is extremely simple in that it will check every executed instruction in order to find any JMP
instruction which uses a register and jumps to a vm handler. When this JMP is executed all native registers, virtual scratch registers, and the virtual stack are saved into a trace entry. Emulation ends when a VMEXIT instruction is found.
You can continue the analysis using IDA outside of the virtual machine and then use VMEmu again once execution enters back into the virtual machine. I have plans to turn this into a library and inherit this library into vmprofiler-qt
and make a split view where you can see what native instructions are executed prior to the next vm entry. However for now this project is used to generate vmtrace files which vmprofiler-qt
can parse.
In order to use VMEmu you must have an unpacked VMProtect 2 binary which you know some basic information about.
Usage: uc-tracer [options...]
Options:
--vmentry relative virtual address to a vm entry... (Required)
--vmpbin path to unpacked virtualized binary... (Required)
--imagebase image base from optional PE header... (Required)
--out output file name for trace file... (Required)
--advancement the way in which the virtual instruction pointer advances... 'forward' or 'backward'... (Required)
-h, --help Shows this page
vm_entry
is the code name for the vmp2 routine which is used to transition control flow from non-virtualized code to virtualized code. Prior to calling this function a value is pushed onto the stack.
push 0xFFFFFFFF890001FA
jmp vm_entry
The value pushed onto the stack is an encrypted RVA to the vm instructions to execute. As you can see below, the value is decrypted inside of the vm_entry
function and is loaded into RSI. The decryption is unique per-build, however it seems that there is only three transformations done, no more, no less.
; pushed value on stack (0xFFFFFFFF890001FA)
mov esi, [rsp+0xA0]
; unique, per-build, decryption. there seems to obly be 3 of these.
not esi
neg esi
ror esi, 0x1A
; vmp2 image base address is always 0x14000000...
mov rax, 0x100000000
add rsi, rax
; add module base
add rsi, [rbp+0]
If you decrypt the encrypted stack value, you end up with 0x140007EE2
. This is the image based address of the virtual instructions which will be executed by the vm. These virtual instructions are encrypted. I talk more about those in the virtual instructions
section of the readme.
calc_jmp
is a part of the vm_entry
routine. vm handler jmp's to this section of code in order to calculate the address of the next vm handler. This code decrypts the first opcode of the next virtual instruction, advances vip, obtains and decrypts the next vm handler's linear virtual address, and finally jmps to it. AL
contains the index into the vm handler table after the jmp, and BL
contains the decryption key for the first opcode. BL
is then used by vm handlers to decrypt immediate values.
; get the first opcode of the next virtual instruction
mov al, [rsi]
; this is in every single vmp2 binary...
; BL contains a "rolling" encryption key...
xor al, bl
; again, three unique transformations...
neg al
rol al, 5
inc al
; this is in every single vmp2 binary...
; BL is a "rolling" encryption key...
; it gets updated here...
xor bl, al
; index into the vm handler table...
movzx rax, al
mov rdx, [r12+rax*8]
; decrypt the vm handler rva...
xor rdx, 7F3D2149h
; advance the virtual instruction pointer (++VIP)
inc rsi
; jmp to next vm handler
add rdx, r13
jmp rdx
virtual instructions are per-build encrypted RISC based instructions. They consist of an encrypted vm handler index, and optionally an encrypted immediate value. They are located inside of .vmp
and .text
sections. When execution of opcodes is desired, a push of an encrypted rva to these opcodes is done. Sadly, the rva is only 32bit's so you cannot easily run your own sequence of vm handlers. I suppose you could but you would need to be near the vmp'ed module in memory.
[vm handler index][immediate value up to 8 bytes]
note that the vm handler index and immediate values are all encrypted
each opcode of a virtual instruction is encrypted by itself.
; note trans is short for transformation...
; this includes: xor, neg, not, nor, add, sub, etc
mov al, [rsi] ; RSI is VIP...
; BL is the byte address of the encrypted opcode...
; (only for the first decryption of the first opcode....)
trans al, bl ; AL is the encrypted opcode...
; note that there is ALWAYS three transformations...
trans al
trans al
trans al
trans bl, al ; at this point AL contains the decrypted opcode
; (which is the vm handler index)...
; BL now can decrypt the next opcode...
; also note that the transformation done to BL is also done to AL...
first opcode decryption of the first virtual instruction
mov al, [rsi] ; RSI is VIP...
trans al, bl ; AL is the encrypted opcode...
; note that there is ALWAYS three transformations...
trans al
trans al
trans al
trans bl, al ; BL contains the decrypt key from the last virtual instruction...
; read the assembly above at this instruction for BL...
first opcode decryption of the second virtual instruction
Each virtual instruction can have a second opcode. This second opcode is decrypted by the "rolling" decryption key stored in BL
. An example of a second opcode would be the first virtual instruction always executed.
movzx eax, byte ptr [rsi]
; transformations done by vm handlers on immediate values are unique...
; unlike the `calc_jmp` block of code which vm handlers use to get to the next virtual instruction...
sub al, bl
; again, three unique transformations done on AL...
ror al, 2
not al
inc al
; the same transformation done al AL is then done on BL with the decrypted opcode...
sub bl, al
; this is some sort of VPOP and store instruction where a value comes off the virtual stack and into a place in RDI
; RDI seems to be scratch space, heap, or a per-binary virtual register mapping, not sure yet.
mov rdx, [rbp+0]
add rbp, 8
mov [rax+rdi], rdx