Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

[release-v0.30.x] Update golang.org/x/crypto #1863

Merged

Conversation

vdemeester
Copy link
Member

Cherry-pick of #1861.

Dependabot bugs us about it with:

Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto #11

Applications and libraries which misuse the
ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an
authorization bypass.

The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call
to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used
to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to
inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control
of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with
multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be
used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if
any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to
PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant
determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make
incorrect assumptions.

For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then
authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first
with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make
authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not
actually control the private key.

Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation
golang.org/x/[email protected] enforces the property that, when
successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to
ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the
connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the
same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the
last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then
authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback,
KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth.

Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return
value from the various authentication callbacks to record data
associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing
external state. Once the connection is established the state
corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved
via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party
libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across
authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to
the relevant projects for guidance.

(cherry picked from commit cbcad5c)

Changes

Submitter Checklist

  • 📝 Please ensure your commit message is clear and informative. For guidance on crafting effective commit messages, refer to the How to write a git commit message guide. We prefer the commit message to be included in the PR body itself rather than a link to an external website (ie: Jira ticket).

  • ♽ Before submitting a PR, run make test lint to avoid unnecessary CI processing. For an even more efficient workflow, consider installing pre-commit and running pre-commit install in the root of this repository.

  • ✨ We use linters to maintain clean and consistent code. Please ensure you've run make lint before submitting a PR. Some linters offer a --fix mode, which can be executed with the command make fix-linters (ensure markdownlint and golangci-lint tools are installed first).

  • 📖 If you're introducing a user-facing feature or changing existing behavior, please ensure it's properly documented.

  • 🧪 While 100% coverage isn't a requirement, we encourage unit tests for any code changes where possible.

  • 🎁 If feasible, please check if an end-to-end test can be added. See README for more details.

  • 🔎 If there's any flakiness in the CI tests, don't necessarily ignore it. It's better to address the issue before merging, or provide a valid reason to bypass it if fixing isn't possible (e.g., token rate limitations).

Dependabot bugs us about it with:

Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass
in golang.org/x/crypto openshift-pipelines#11

```
Applications and libraries which misuse the
ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an
authorization bypass.

The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call
to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used
to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to
inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control
of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with
multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be
used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if
any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to
PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant
determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make
incorrect assumptions.

For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then
authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first
with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make
authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not
actually control the private key.

Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation
golang.org/x/[email protected] enforces the property that, when
successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to
ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the
connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the
same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the
last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then
authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback,
KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth.

Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return
value from the various authentication callbacks to record data
associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing
external state. Once the connection is established the state
corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved
via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party
libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across
authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to
the relevant projects for guidance.
```

(cherry picked from commit cbcad5c)
@chmouel chmouel merged commit f1b883f into openshift-pipelines:release-v0.30.x Dec 13, 2024
3 checks passed
@vdemeester vdemeester deleted the update-crypto branch December 13, 2024 10:49
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

2 participants